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VILLA GE OF SCHA UMBURG V. CITIZENS FOR
A BETTER ENVIRONMENT AND RELIGIOUS
SOLICITATION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION
CONVERGE
By William P. Marshall*
INTRODUCTION
For more than forty years, the canvassing and soliciting activities
of religious groups have been recognized as protected activities under
the first amendment. The efforts of the Jehovah's Witnesses in attack-
ing governmental regulation of this activity have resulted in "a full
chapter of constitutional law"' by the Supreme Court.
The first amendment doctrines that have been developed in this
chapter are as important as they are diverse. Examples of these doc-
trines include the expansion of the public forum,2 the limitation of state
discretion in licensing laws,3 the concept of "fighting words,"4 and, per-
haps most importantly, the understanding that the door-to-door dis-
semination of ideas and information is one of the most vital methods of
exercising first amendment rights.5
The most controversial holding of the door-to-door solicitation
cases was announced in Murdock v. Pennsylvania.6 In a five to four
decision, the Court ruled that, not only was the dissemination of reli-
gious information and the distribution of religious literature a pro-
tected activity,7 but the organization's appeal for funds was presumed
to be protected as well.' Murdock thus marked the first time the Court
* J.D. 1977, University of Chicago.
1. Kalven, The Concept ofthe Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1,
1.
2. See, e.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147 (1939).
3. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938).
4. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
5. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145 (1943).
6. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
7. Id at 117.
8. The Murdock court did not directly state that the Jehovah's Witnesses' solicitation of
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held that there was positive first amendment value in an appeal for
funds.
One of the questions left unanswered in Murdock was whether a
secular organization, or a religious group which had no religiously-
mandated requirement to solicit (as did the Witnesses), could claim
that their fund raising practices were entitled to first amendment pro-
tection as well. Thirty-seven years later, the question was answered in
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment.' In that
case, the Court held that the solicitation of funds for charitable pur-
poses by a nonreligious organization was "within the protections of the
first amendment."' 0 Since Murdock, the Court had concluded in Vir-
ginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council I that even com-
mercial speech was entitled to some first amendment protection, albeit
to a lesser degree than the core of noncommercial speech found at issue
in Murdock. Therefore, the Schaumburg decision would not have been
significant had the Court relied on Virginia Pharmacy, thus avoiding
the Murdock issues. The Court, however, made it clear that the chari-
table appeal for funds was more than simply commercial speech; it was
characterized as core first amendment activity. 2 Particularly notewor-
thy is the fact that the Court reached this decision with no more than
passing reference to Murdock, again leaving unsettled the possibility
that Murdock was solely a religious, and not a speech case.
The Schaumburg opinion comes at a time when the lower courts
are dealing with a flurry of cases concerning the constitutionality of
regulations affecting solicitation by religious organizations. 13 Although
funds was protected under the first amendment, but this proposition can be inferred from
the Court's holding. See id at I 11.
9. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
10. Id at 632.
11. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
12. 444 U.S. at 632.
13. E.g., ISKCON v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1979); ISKCON v. Bowen, 600 F.2d
667 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1980); ISKCON v. Rochford, 585 F.2d 263
(7th Cir. 1978), afl'ing inpart and vacating inpart, 425 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Edwards
v. Maryland State Fair, 476 F. Supp. 153 (D. Md. 1979); Fernandes v. Limmer, 465 F. Supp.
493 (N.D. Tex. 1979); United States v. Silberman, 464 F. Supp. 866 (M.D. Fla. 1979);
Walker v. Wegner, 477 F. Supp. 648 (D.S.D. 1979); ISKCON v. State Fair, 461 F. Supp. 719
(N.D. Tex. 1978); Hall v. McNamara, 456 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Cal. 1978); ISKCON v.
Kearnes, 454 F. Supp. 116 (E.D. Cal. 1978); ISKCON v. Griffin, 437 F. Supp. 666 (W.D. Pa.
1977); ISKCON v. Evans, 440 F. Supp. 414 (S.D. Ohio 1977); ISKCON v. Conlisk, 374 F.
Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1973); ISKCON v. City of New Orleans, 347 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. La.
1972).
This list is by no means exhaustive. Both the International Society for Krishna Con-
sciousness (ISKCON) and the Unification Church have separately undertaken litigation
campaigns against various forms of governmental regulations of solicitation activity. All the
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Schaumburg was not a freedom of religion case, the decision will have
a profound effect on these lower court cases. The Schaumburg opinion
suggests that certain types of state regulation can be maintained against
even constitutionally protected solicitation. 14
More fundamentally, however, Schaumburg will affect these lower
court cases by contributing to our understanding of the first amend-
ment values inherent in solicitation activity. The solicitation issue had
not been before the Court since Murdock. The extent to which
Schaumburg supplements the Murdock holding regarding religious so-
licitation is critical to this new series of religious solicitation cases.
This article will examine: 1) Schaumburg and its historical prece-
dents, particularly Murdock, in an effort to determine what effect the
decision will have on the religious solicitation controversy; 2) the
speech and religious liberty interests that the Court has found in solici-
tation activity; and 3) the effect, if any, that those interests have upon
each other. This article takes no position regarding the desirability of
state regulation of solicitation, whether religious or secular, other than
to take the Court at its word that such regulation, if properly tailored,
furthers important state interests and can be constitutionally applied
even to protected first amendment activity.
15
I. VILLAGE OF SCHA uMBURG v CITIZENS FOR A BETTER
ENVIRONMENT: AN INITIAL GLANCE
In 1974, the Village of Schaumburg, Illinois, enacted a compre-
hensive ordinance regulating the solicitation activities of charitable or-
ganizations within the Village.16 Specifically, the ordinance required
that "[e]very charitable organization, which solicits or intends to solicit
cases listed above, for example, have representatives of either the Unification Church or
ISKCON as plaintiffs. See also FISHER, FROM CATHOLIC-BAITERS TO "CULTISTS": RELI-
GIOUS SOLICITORS IN THE COURTS (1979), for an account of some of the issues and strategies
behind the litigation campaigns. Mr. Fisher is well-versed on the subject as he has repre-
sented both the Unification Church and ISKCON in many of these cases.
14. See text accompanying note 49 infra.
15. In Rakay & Sugarman, A Reconsideration of the Religious Exemption: The Needfor
FinancialDisclosure of Religious Fund Rairing and Solicitation Practices, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REv.
863 (1978), the authors strongly argued that state regulation of solicitations should be main-
tained against religious organizations. For an account of fraudulent fund raising solicitation
schemes that have been perpetrated in the name of religion, see C. BAKAL, CHARITY U.S.A.
(1979). Of particular interest are the author's accounts of the Sister Kinney and the Pallot-
tine Mission scandals.
16. The ordinance is entitled "An Ordinance Regulating Soliciting by Charitable Orga-
nizations," and is codified as Article III of Chapter 22 of the Schaumburg Village Code,
VILLAGE OF SCHAUMBURG, ILL., CODE ch. 22, art. III (1974).
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contributions from persons in the village by door-to-door solicitation or
the use of public streets and public ways, shall prior to such solicitation
apply for a permit."' 7 The regulatory scheme required that such per-
mit application be denied or granted on the basis of whether or not the
particular application satisfied certain criteria required by the ordi-
nance. Solicitation without a permit was prohibited.'8
One of the conditions that a charitable organization had to meet to
be eligible for a permit under the Schaumburg ordinance was to satis-
factorily prove that at least seventy-five percent of the proceeds of its
solicitations would be used directly for the charitable purpose of the
organization, and not applied to administrative expenses. 19
The plaintiffs, Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), were a
group "organized for the purpose, among others, of protecting, main-
taining, and enhancing the quality of the Illinois environment. ' 20 They
applied for, but were denied, a solicitation permit because they were
unable to demonstrate that they complied with the seventy-five percent
limitation.21 On the basis of this denial, CBE sued the Village in fed-
eral district court charging that the seventy-five percent limitation vio-
lated their rights under the first and fourteenth amendments.22
CBE, in its complaint, described its solicitation activities as both
an effort to achieve financial support and as an informational activity
designed to provide literature, answer questions, and receive com-
plaints from the public regarding environmental issues. The Village, in
its response, alleged that the charitable purposes of CBE were "negligi-
ble as compared with the primary objective of raising funds.
'23
In its complaint, CBE portrayed itself as an organization engaged
in core (noncommercial) first amendment conduct. The Village ordi-
nance was therefore characterized as a direct and impermissible re-
straint of such protected activity. The Village attempted to portray
CBE and its activities as being solely commercial in nature to negate
the argument that the ordinance invaded the province of core first
amendment activity.
CBE, relying on the "overbreadth" doctrine, prevailed. 24 CBE
17. VILLAGE OF SCHAUMBURG, ILL., CODE § 22-20 (1974).
18. VILLAGE OF SCHAUMBURG, ILL., ORDINANCE 1052, §§ 1, 8 (1974).
19. VILLAGE OF SCHAUMBURG, ILL., CODE § 22-20(g) (1974).
20. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. at 625.
21. Id
22. Id
23. Id at 626.
24. The "overbreadth" doctrine operates as an exception to the law of standing as it
grants an aggrieved litigant, whose own speech was unprotected, the right to challenge the
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was granted a motion for summary judgment in the district court,
which held that the seventy-five percent limitation was void on its face.
On appeal, the Village claimed that summary judgment was inappro-
priate given the factual disputes regarding CBE's fund raising prac-
tices.25 The Seventh Circuit rejected the Village's argument. It
affirmed the lower court decision because CBE attacked the ordinance
on tbe grounds that it infringed core first amendment activity, and
therefore, CBE was entitled to have the constitutionality of the ordi-
nance judged on its face. The Seventh Circuit found the specific fac-
tual nature of CBE's activities to be immaterial.26
The Supreme Court affirmed in a decision written by Justice
White.27 The Court wasted no time in addressing the heart of the Vil-
lage's contention that the ordinance regulated only commercial and not
protected activity. The Village urged that the ordinance should be sus-
tained because it dealt only with solicitation and not with a charity's
right to spread its views door-to-door without a permit.28 The Court
did not find the Village's argument persuasive and concluded that the
financial and nonfinancial aspects of the solicitation could not be con-
stitutionally distinguished. The entire solicitation encounter was of
first amendment concern.29
The next question which faced the Court was whether the district
and circuit courts, by reviewing the statute on its face without reference
to the factual nature of CBE's fund raising practices, properly adjudi-
cated the constitutionality of the statute. The Village contended that
CBE was more of a commercial than a noncommercial venture and
thus did not have standing to argue that the ordinance infringed upon
noncommercial or protected activity, an activity in which CBE was not
engaged?.0 The Supreme Court again disagreed with the Village. The
Court noted that although overbreadth analysis was inappropriate in
commercial speech contexts, facial review of the statute was appropri-
ate under the overbreadth doctrine in a noncommercial setting."' The
Court stated that the charitable appeal for funds was a form of non-
constitutionality of a statute which purports to "prohibit protected speech or even speech
arguably protected" on the grounds that the regulation works as an overbroad intrusion into
protected areas. Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 59 (1976).
25. 590 F.2d 220, 223 (7th Cir. 1978).
26. Id
27. Eight Justices voted to affirm; Justice Rehnquist dissented.
28. 444 U.S. at 628.
29. Id at 632.
30. Id at 633.
31. Id at 634.
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commercial speech.32
Having allowed the overbreadth challenge, the Court was quickly
able to dismiss the seventy-five percent limitation as being unconstitu-
tional.33 The Village's prime defense was that the regulation served the
Village's substantial interest in protecting the public from fraud. The
Village argued that the percentage limitation furthered this purpose be-
cause the Village had specifically found that any organization using
more than twenty-five percent of its receipts for administration consti-
tuted a commercial, and not a charitable, organization and that for
such an organization to represent itself as a charity was fraudulent.34
The Court rejected this premise and agreed with the Seventh Circuit
that certain charitable organizations, specifically those that disseminate
information about and advocate positions on matters of public concern,
"necessarily would be unable to comply with the percentage limitation
due to the inherent nature of those organizations. ' 35 Therefore, the
classification was overlybroad and the Village could not delineate such
groups as "fraudulent." The seventy-five percent requirement was too
narrowly drawn and was therefore constitutionally void.36
The Court stated that the Village might employ some less intrusive
means to further its legitimate interest in preventing fraud. The Vil-
lage, according to the Court, could utilize its penal laws to directly pun-
ish fraudulent misrepresentations.37 Misrepresentations about
charitable status might also be prevented, according to the Court, by
disclosure laws which would inform the public about how their contri-
butions were being spent.38 The Court also noted a third possibility,39
the legislative scheme upheld in National Foundation v. Fort Worth.40
Although there was a percentage limitation in National Foundation
similar to that in Schaumburg's statutory scheme, this limitation could
be waived if the organization established that its administrative costs
were reasonable.
The Court concluded its opinion by briefly addressing and dis-
32. Id at 632.
33. Id at 635.
34. Id at 636.
35. Id at 635.
36. Id at 637.
37. Id The Court cited Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), and Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), as support for this proposition.
38. In this regard, the Court favorably noted that an Illinois statute required charitable
organizations to register with the Attorney General's office and to report certain information
about their structure and fund raising activities. 444 U.S. at 638 n.12.
39. Id at 635 n.9.
40. 415 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970).
[Vol. 13
VILLAGE OF SCHA UMB UR G
missing the Village's secondary argument that the ordinance was a le-
gitimate means to promote public safety. As the Court pointed out, the
relationship of the percentage limitation to public safety was attenuated
at best, and certainly not of sufficient precision to withstand constitu-
tional challenge.4'
II. VLLAGE OF SCH.4 UMBURG V CITIZENS FOR .4 BETTER
ENVIRONMENT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The central and critical holding of the Schaumburg case is clear:
the appeal for charitable contributions is a protected activity under the
first amendment.42 The Court's theoretical and precedential basis,
however, is not clear. Justice White took great care to state that chari-
table solicitations are protected and that this holding involved no new
conclusions on the part of the Court. He treated the issue almost cava-
lierly: "The issue before us, then, is not whether charitable solicitations
...are within the protections of the First Amendment. It is clear that
they are."43 The Court, however, had never held that the solicitations
of any nonreligious group were to be construed as protected activity.
The Court therefore was disingenuous in describing this holding as
"clear." In what is undoubtedly the most critical passage in the opin-
ion, Justice White reasoned as follows:
Prior authorities, therefore, clearly establish that charitable
appeals for funds, on the street or door to door, involve a vari-
ety of speech interests--communication of information, the
dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the
advocacy of causes-that are within the protection of the First
Amendment. Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly sub-
ject to reasonable regulation but the latter must be under-
taken with due regard for the reality that solicitation is
characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps
persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for
41. 444 U.S. at 638-39.
42. Id at 633. Justice'Rehnquist argued in dissent that the holding was not clear be-
cause the Court granted first amendment status only to the solicitation activities of those
groups whose "primary purpose is ... to disseminate information about and advocate posi-
tions on matters of public concern," id at 635, or to those groups who are "primarily en-
gaged in research, advocacy, or public education and that use their own paid staff to carry
out these functions as well as to solicit financial support." Id at 642. Justice Rehnquist
wryly suggests this conclusion consists of two separate results. See id at 641-42. Justice
Rehnquist apparently misinterpreted the Court's opinion, however, because the Court
clearly indicated that all charitable solicitation is protected activity. Id at 632.
43. Id at 633.
1980]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
particular views on economic, political or social issues, and
for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such infor-
mation and advocacy would likely cease. Canvassers in such
contexts are necessarily more than solicitors for money. Fur-
thermore, because charitable solicitation does more than in-
form private economic decisions and is not primarily
concerned with providing information about the characteris-
tics and costs of goods and services, it has not been dealt with
in our cases as a variety of purely commercial speech.'
The Court stated that solicitation involves the communication of
information, the dissemination and propagation of views, and the ad-
vocacy of causes.45 It is also intertwined with informative and persua-
sive speech and is necessary as a financial reality to preserve the
group's ability to continue the flow of information and ideas.46 The
Court noted that all these "elements" are of course within the protec-
tion of the first amendment.47 Because the charitable appeal for funds
contains these first amendment "elements," the Court concluded that
the charitable appeal itself is core first amendment speech.48 The
Court's conclusion, however, does not follow from the Court's premise.
Simply stated, the fact that there are elements of first amendment
concern within a given activity does not necessarily dictate that the ac-
tivity as a whole should be construed as protected speech. If it did,
then all actions in which an idea was somehow expressed would have
to be construed as first amendment activity. This, of course, has never
been the theory of the Court.49 For example, it is clear that there are
"speech" elements in what is known as commercial speech. In fact, it
was the presence of such elements that led the Court in Virginia Phar-
macy5° to overrule the previous doctrine that commercial speech was
not entitled to any first amendment protection. Virginia Pharmacy and
its progeny5' make it clear that the mere existence of "speech" elements
does not entitle a given communication to be automatically accorded
noncommercial speech status. If it were otherwise, the commer-





49. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
50. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
51. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S.
350 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
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cial/noncommercial distinction would collapse. Justice White's "ele-
ments" approach is thus not precedentially sound.
The Court was on firmer ground in arguing that precedential au-
thorities had established that first amendment values did inhere in cer-
tain solicitation activity. However, none of the cases cited by the Court
involved the financial solicitations of any nonreligious organizations.
They therefore cannot be construed to stand directly for the proposition
that the solicitation of funds by nonreligious groups constitutes pro-
tected activity under the first amendment. Further examination was
required by the Court in order to determine how critical the religious
aspect of the solicitation was to the previous cases, but such examina-
tion in Schaumburg is lacking.
The Court's use of precedents in the Schaumburg opinion is in-
triguing. The Court listed chronologically and discussed in turn nine
cases which relate to canvassing and soliciting by religious and charita-
ble organizations. There is no effort in the opinion to evaluate the
precedential weight or relevance of these cases. This is particularly sur-
prising because at least two of the cases arguably stand as authority
against the position the Court ultimately takes.52 In two other cases the
activity involved no financial aspects.53 The final five cases, including
Murdock, involved only the activities of religious organizations.54
However, the Court did not discuss whether the religious solicitation
cases are authority in the review of the constitutionality of regulations
aimed at nonreligious organizations. In its discussion of Murdock, the
Court did not state whether Murdock turned on freedom of speech or
freedom of religion. A separate examination of these cases is therefore
in order.
As Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent in Schaumburg, the first
two cases discussed by the Court, Schneider v. State55 and Cantwell v.
Connecticut,56 turned on the excessive amount of discretion that the
licensing officials had in determining which organizations would be
granted permits to solicit or distribute literature within their communi-
52. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942).
53. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945). No financial activity was involved in Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
54. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
55. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
56. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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ties." The licensing system in those two cases involved a system of
governmental censorship that was constitutionally impermissible.5"
The only relation that Cantwell and Schneider have to the solicitation
issue is that both cases held that the fact that a financial appeal accom-
panied the dissemination of information, did not automatically trans-
form the venture into a commercial activity. The regulations before the
Court in those cases prohibited far more than the financial aspect of the
Witnesses' activity; they inhibited the rights of the Witnesses to express
their views and disseminate their literature.59 The regulations therefore
were not so narrowly drawn as to avoid infringing upon protected areas
and thus were unconstitutional. The Court in both Schneider and
Cantwell noted that the solicitation of funds could be subject to general
regulation.6 °
Valentine v. Chrestensen6' and Breard v. Alexandria62 are authority
for the proposition that commercial solicitations are susceptible to state
regulation. 63 What is especially interesting about Schaumburg's cita-
tion of these cases is that their conclusions as to what is commercial, or
nonprotected speech, seem to conflict with that in Schaumburg. The
holding of Valentine was that the mere presence of matters of possible
public interest in an otherwise commercial solicitation does not auto-
matically transform that solicitation into a noncommercial enterprise.64
In so holding, the Valentine Court employed a tact directly opposite to
the one noted above in Cantwell and Schneider, that the presence of a
financial appeal in a religious solicitation does not automatically trans-
form the religious appeal into a commercial venture. Thus, the argua-
ble implication of Valentine, in light of Cantwell and Schneider, is that
57. 444 U.S. at 640 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist argued that Largent v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943), was distinguishable on this ground. As to the distinguishing
aspect of Largent, Justice Rehnquist is correct. The holding in Largent, another religious
solicitation case, did turn on excessive discretion. It has not been included in this analysis
because the Schaumburg Court did not appear to cite Largent in its own right other than to
note that the case stood for substantially the same proposition as did Jamison v. Texas, 318
U.S. 413 (1943).
58. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. at 163-64; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. at 305-07.
59. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. at 163; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. at 305.
60. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. at 165; Cantwell v. Connecticutt, 310 U.S. at 306-07.
61. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
62. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
63. Valentine and Breard were hallmarks of the now out-dated commercial speech doc-
trine which held that commercial speech was wholly outside first amendment protection.
Commercial speech is now held to be entitled some, albeit not full, first amendment protec-
tion. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
64. 316 U.S. at 54.
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only financial appeals of religious groups are noncommercial, as op-
posed to commercial activity.
The Breard holding is even more solidly against that in Schaum-
burg. In Breard the Court upheld, as to a magazine subscription solici-
tor, an ordinance which prohibited "solicitors, peddlers, hawkers,
itinerant merchants, or transient vendors of merchandise" from can-
vassing on private property without permission.65 The Court, in Follett
v. McCormick 66 and Murdock v. Pennsylvania,6 7 had previously held
that the "sale" of religious literature was a protected activity. The
Court in Martin v. Struthers68 had struck down an ordinance similar to
the one in Breard on the ground that such an ordinance was an imper-
missible restraint on the freedom to disseminate literature under the
first amendment. 9 Seeking to expand these holdings to a nonreligious
financial solicitation context, the petitioner in Breard attacked the ordi-
nance as being an infringement on his first amendment rights of free-
dom of speech and of the press.70 The Court, however, rejected the
argument, and in doing so, explicitly limited the Martin holding to its
factual situation, wherein the literature being distributed was an invita-
tion to a religious service. 71 The Breard petitioner, because he was not
engaged in a religious activity, was not considered by the Court to be
engaging in anything other than commercial conduct.
72
Three of the other decisions discussed in Schaumburg, Martin v.
Struthers,73 Thomas v. Collins,74 and Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell,75 in-
volved no question of the solicitation of funds at all. Martin involved
an attack by a Jehovah's Witness against an ordinance that provided as
follows:
It is unlawful for any person distributing handbills, circulars
or other advertisements to ring the door bell, sound the door
knocker, or otherwise summon the inmate or inmates of any
residence to the door for the purpose of receiving such hand-
bills, circulars or other advertisements they or any person
65. 341 U.S. at 624.
66. 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
67. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
68. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
69. Id at 149.
70. 341 U.S. at 625.
71. Id at 643.
72. Id at 642.
73. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
74. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
75. 425 U.S. 610 (1976).
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with them may be distributing.76
The ordinance was obviously not aimed at the problem of
financial appeals but, in the interests of privacy, was an all out ban on
the dissemination and distribution of literature. Not surprisingly, the
Court struck down the ordinance on free speech grounds. Justice
Black, speaking for the Court, engaged in a lengthy dissertation as to
the first amendment value in canvassing:
While door to door distributors of literature may be either a
nuisance or a blind for criminal activities, they may also be
useful members of society engaged in the dissemination of
ideas in accordance with the best tradition of free discussion.
The widespread use of this method of communication by
many groups espousing various causes attests its major impor-
tance. . . . Many of our most widely established religious or-
ganizations have used this method of disseminating their
doctrines, and laboring groups have used it in recruiting their
members. . . . Door to door distribution of circulars is essen-
tial to the poorly financed causes of little people."
Justice Black noted, however, that ordinances regulating fund rais-
ing activity involved substantially different considerations than were
present in those governing the dissemination of literature alone. Regu-
lation of fund raising was permissible. This distinction between fund
raising and protected activity was later expanded in Thomas v. Col-
fins.7
8
The Collins case put into issue the constitutionality of a Texas stat-
ute which required a labor organizer to register before soliciting mem-
bership in his organization. R.J. Thomas, a labor organizer, tested the
statute by addressing a mass meeting in which he advocated that those
in attendance join his labor organization. He was convicted on a con-
tempt charge brought under the statute. The Supreme Court reversed.
The requirement of registration prior to engaging in discussion of-
fended Thomas' right of free speech under the first amendment.7 9 The
Collins Court distinguished the situation before it from cases in which
the solicitation of funds was involved by stating that a requirement to
register before a person made a public speech was incompatible with
the first amendment.80 However, once a speaker undertakes the collec-
76. 319 U.S. at 142.
77. Id at 145-46.
78. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
79. Id at 541.
80. Id at 540.
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tion of funds or secures subscriptions, a reasonable registration may be
imposed.8'
The third case, Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell,82 is similarly of no avail
in establishing that fund raising can be considered first amendment ac-
tivity. In Hynes, the Court sustained a vagueness challenge brought by
political canvassers against an ordinance that required door-to-door
canvassers to register prior to canivassing.83 Although Hynes did recog-
nize the first amendment values inherent in canvassing, 84 and reinter-
preted Martin so as not to confine that opinion to religious factors (as
Breard had),85 there is nothing in the Hynes decision which suggests
that fund raising shares this first amendment importance.
It is interesting that the Court cited Martin, Collins, and Hynes to
reach its conclusion that solicitation can be construed as protected ac-
tivity. The Village attempted to distinguish activity involving pure dis-
semination of views from situations in which an appeal for funds was
involved. Ironically, support for this distinction, which was ultimately
rejected by the Court, is found in these cases.
The only two cases that remained in the Court's review from
which it might infer that the charitable appeal for funds is protected
activity are Jamison v. Texas86 and Murdock v. Pennsylvania.87 Jami-
son does indicate that fund raising can be protected activity but the
decision is explicitly based on the free exercise clause and not on the
free speech clause. In Jamison, a Jehovah's Witness attacked a munici-
pal ordinance regulating the distribution of literature. The ordinance
differed from the ones struck down in Cantwell and Schneider in that it
was nondiscretionary. Nonetheless, the application of the ordinance
was held to be unconstitutional.88 The dependence by the Jamison
Court on the free exercise clause is in fact disclosed by the Schaumburg
Court. Jamison is cited for the proposition that
although purely commercial leaflets could be banned from the
streets, a State could not 'prohibit the distribution of handbills
in the pursuit of a clearly religious activity merely because the
handbills invite the purchase of books for the improved un-
derstanding of the religion or because the handbills seek in a
81. Id
82. 425 U.S. 610 (1976).
83. Id at 623.
84. Id at 617-18.
85. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
86. 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
87. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
88. 318 U.S. at 417.
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lawful fashion to promote the raising of funds for religious
purposes.'8 9
The Schaumburg Court does not provide any insight as to why the pro-
motion of religious interests, as was present in Jamison, is authority for
finding that CBE's secular solicitations are similarly entitled to first
amendment protection. The distinguishing aspect of Jamison is seem-
ingly ignored.
Nor does the Court provide this insight in its subsequent treatment
of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.90 Murdock is cited by Schaumburg as es-
tablishing that the "sale of religious literature by itinerant evangelists
spreading their doctrine [is] not a commercial enterprise beyond the
protection of the first amendment." 9' Again, Schaumburg is silent as to
why solicitation in a religious context is equal to solicitation in a secu-
lar context. Certainly there are reasons for equating the two, but these
reasons should have been discussed. This is particularly true in regard
to the Murdock case because that case was severely criticized for hav-
ing granted religious solicitors special privileges and exemptions not
accorded nonreligious organizations and persons.92
The Court, in short, is being either disingenuous or careless in au-
tomatically applying cases with religious freedom overtones to nonreli-
gious subjects without extrapolation or analysis. Freedom of speech
and freedom of religion have never been held to be synonymous. It
therefore remains necessary to examine how, if at all, the evangelistic
practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses in the 1940's can be equated with
the fund raising practices of an environmental protection group in the
1980's in determining a thread of first amendment concern.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT BASES OF RELIGIOUS SOLICITATION:
MURDOCK V PENNSYLVANIA
The seminal case establishing a positive first amendment value in
fund raising was Murdock v. Pennsylvania.93 At issue was the constitu-
tionality of a municipal ordinance which exacted a license tax on the
sale of periodicals within the municipality as applied to the distribution
methods for literature by the Jehovah's Witnesses. 4 The distribution
89. 444 U.S. at 630 (citing Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943)).
90. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
91. 444 U.S. 630 (1980).
92. See notes 118-20 infra and accompanying text.
93. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
94. The challenged ordinance required that any person seeking to canvass or solicit in
the community must pay a license tax at the rate of $1.50 per day, $7.00 per week, $12.00 per
two weeks, or $20.00 per three weeks. Id at 106.
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methods in Murdock involved door-to-door "sales" of religious books
and pamphlets, where the "price" of the books was twenty-five cents
and the "price" of the pamphlets was five cents. However, the Wit-
nesses would accept a lower price or even donate the volumes to an
interested person who could not afford the literature. 95
One year before Murdock, in Jones v. Opelika,96 the Court had
upheld the constitutionality of a similar license tax on this type of activ-
ity. The Opelika Court, by Mr. Justice Reed, stated:
There is to be noted, too, a distinction between nondiscrimi-
natory regulation of operations which are incidental to the ex-
ercise of religion or the freedom of speech or the press and
those which are imposed upon the religious rite itself or the
unmixed dissemination of information ...
When proponents of religious or social theories use the
ordinary commercial methods of sales of articles to raise
propaganda funds, it is a natural and proper exercise of the
power of the State to charge reasonable fees for the privilege
of canvassing. Careful as we may and should be to protect
the freedoms safeguarded by the Bill of Rights, it is difficult to
see in such enactments a shadow of prohibition of the exercise
of religion or of abridgement of the freedom of speech or the
press.97
The Court in Murdock overruled the Opelika decision in a five to
four decision,98 and held that the license tax on the sale of literature
was void as to the literature "sales" of the Jehovah's Witnesses under-
taken in their evangelistic efforts. The Court considered the taxes an
improper abridgement of the Witnesses' first amendment rights.99
It is ambiguous, however, which first amendment freedom the
Court in Murdock held was abridged by the license tax. The Court did
not distinguish between the liberties of speech or religion. This ambi-
guity has led to differing interpretations of Murdock. °° Thus, Mur-
95. Id at 107.
96. 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
97. Id at 596-97.
98. Justices Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Roberts dissented. All four Justices had
been in the majority in Opelika. The Court's reversal was due to the replacement of Justice
Byrne with Justice Rutledge during the interim between Opelika and Murdock. On rehear-
ing, Opelika was decided the same day as Murdock in a one paragraph per curiam opinion
that relied totally on the Murdock decision. 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
99. 319 U.S. at 117.
100. For example, the Court in Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 761 (1976), interpreted Murdock as resting on speech grounds, while the Court in
Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 576 (1944), relied on Murdock as a free exercise case.
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dock could be interpreted as extending to nonreligious solicitation the
same protection afforded religious solicitation. But the Court, in
Schaumburg, while indicating that nonreligious solicitation was a pro-
tected activity, did not indicate whether its holding was precipitated by
Murdock or some other authority. Thus, the ambiguity in Murdock
remains unresolved and requires further investigation.
Initially, the Court in Murdock noted the religious significance in-
herent in the distribution of religious literature. 10' The Court appears
to have described the solicitation activity as religious in nature:
The hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of
missionary evangelism-as old as the history of printing
presses. It has been a potent force in various religious move-
ments down through the years. . . . It is more than preach-
ing; it is more than distribution of religious literature. It is a
combination of both. Its purpose is as evangelical as the revi-
val meeting. This form of religious activity occupies the same
high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the
churches and preaching from the pulpits.'0 2
However at a later point the Court referred to the Witnesses' prac-
tices as involving a speech right:
The constitutional rights of those spreading their religious be-
liefs through the spoken and printed word are not to be
gauged by standards governing retailers or wholesalers of
books. The right to use the press for expressing one's views is
not to be measured by the protection afforded commercial
handbills. It should be remembered that the pamphlets of
Thomas Paine were not distributed free of charge."0 3
But the Court again returned to describing the activity in religious
terms:
Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can
make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources
necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privi-
lege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can
Professor Kurland, in his comprehensive analysis of the Supreme Court and the freedom of
religion, argues that Murdock was based on speech and religion. See Kurland, Of Church
and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 49 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Kurland]. See also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 420-21 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as EMERSON].
101. 319 U.S. at 108-09.
102. Id (footnotes omitted).
103. Id at Ill.
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close its doors to all those who do not have a full purse."°
Yet, at another point the Court referred to the liberty being protected
in terms of issues relating to freedom of the press. 105 The Court, citing
Grosean v. American Press Co. ,"06 described the challenged tax as a
"tax on knowledge" of the kind designed to inhibit the distribution of
printed material. °7
The closest the Murdock Court comes to definitively stating which
liberty or liberties are at issue appears in its concluding statement
where the Court describes the license tax as being "an abridgment of
freedom of press and a restraint on the free exercise of religion."'' 0 8 But
the absence of a reference to freedom of speech in this statement clouds
even this holding.0 9 The Court apparently did not believe it was nec-
essary to distinguish which liberty was allegedly infringed by the tax
ordinance in order to decide the case. Once the Court decided that a
first amendment freedom was at issue, the matter was settled even
though the specific nature of the liberty involved remained nonspecific.
According to the Court, the liberties of speech, press, and religion were
all preferred, 110 and presumably equal.I I I
The failure of the Court to explicitly delineate the nature of the
liberty involved is understandable considering the first amendment
framework pertaining to canvassing and solicitation issues that existed
at the time of the opinion. Murdock was one of a series of Jehovah's
Witnesses cases"12 and the relationship of Murdock to previous cases
104. Id at 112.
105. Id at 111.
106. 297 U.S. 233 (1936). The Grosjean case involved an attack upon a Louisiana statute
that discriminately exacted a heavy tax upon larger newspapers- while exempting smaller
papers. The Court found the tax to be a deliberate and calculated device to suppress the
large newspapers in the state. No finding of improper legislative motivation was present as
it was in Murdock. For an account of the Louisiana tax case, see Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH
IN THE UNITED STATES 381-84 (1976) and EMERSON, supra note 100, at 418-19.
107. 319 U.S. at 115 (emphasis added).
108. Id at 117.
109. Freedom of speech was expressly mentioned earlier in the opinion. 1d at 115. Jus-
tice Douglas' continued reference to freedom of the press throughout the Murdock opinion
may have been an effort on his part to develop a first amendment doctrine immunizing the
press from regulations of general applicability. See also Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622,
650 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting). The issue of whether special protections exist for the insti-
tutional press remains an open issue. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 795, 796-801
(1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
110. 319 U.S. at 115.
111. Id The Court stated, "[f]reedom of press, freedom of speech, [and] freedom of reli-
gion are in a preferred position." Id
112. The cases are collected in Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273-289 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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involving the Witnesses may serve to explain the Court's lack of dis-
tinction. In Lovell v. Griffin1 13 and Schneider v. State,' 4 the Court had
previously held that the distribution of all but commercial handbills
and literature was protected activity under the speech and press clauses
of the first amendment. 115 Because the religious literature distributed
by the Witnesses was posited by the Court as being noncommercial, it
was deemed protected under the speech and press clauses.
The touchstone of the Court's inquiry in these cases, it is important
to note, was whether or not the solicitation or canvassing activity was
commercial. The issue was not whether the activity was religious. The
Court's denomination of canvassing or soliciting activities as religious
in nature was initially a shorthand, based on Lovell and Schneider, to
indicate that the activity in question was not commercial." 6 The dis-
tinction between religious activity and other noncommercial activity
was not yet of vital concern, and apparently remained of little concern
to the Murdock majority who continued to present its inquiry in terms
of the commercial/noncommercial dichotomy."
7
The extent to which Murdock turned on peculiarly religious, as
opposed to simply noncommercial, factors was of vital concern to the
Murdock dissenters. In arguments never answered by the majority, the
dissenters argued that the decision created a special exemption for reli-
gious activity over and above that accorded comparable secular activ-
ity. The dissent viewed the majority's position as creating a dangerous
precedent. Justice Jackson focused on the religious/nonreligious dis-
tinction:
In my view, the First Amendment assures the broadest
tolerable exercise of free speech, free press, and free assembly
not. . . political, economic, scientific, new or informational
ends as well. When limits are reached which such communi-
cations must observe, can one go farther under the cloak of
religious evangelism? Does what is obscene, or commercial,
or abusive, or inciting become less so if employed to promote
113. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
114. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
115. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. at 165.
116. The manner by which what was essentially a speech right (the distribution of litera-
ture in the Schneider case) was transformed, almost by accident, into a free exercise right is
discussed in depth in Kurland, supra note 100, at 36-43.
117. See, e.g., 319 U.S. at 111, where the Court stated "it plainly cannot be said that
petitioners were engaged in a commercial rather than a religious venture." Id (emphasis
added). Of similar effect is the Court's holding that "the mere fact the religious literature is
'sold'... does not transform evangelism into a commercial enterprise." Id
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a religious ideology? I had not supposed that the rights of
secular and nonreligious communications were more narrow
or in any way inferior to those of avowed religious groups.'
1 8
Justice Jackson then noted that special protection for religious groups
was not required by the first amendment:
It may be asked why then does the First Amendment sepa-
rately mention free exercise of religion? The history of reli-
gious persecution gives the answer. Religion needed specific
protection because it was subject to attack from a separate
quarter. It was often claimed that one was an heretic and
guilty of blasphemy because he failed to conform in mere be-
lief, or in support of prevailing institutions and theology. It
was to assure religious teaching as much freedom as secular
discussion, rather than to assure it greater license, that led to
its separate statement.' 9
Justice Frankfurter's dissent expounded upon Justice Jackson's
last point. Justice Frankfurter contended that not only is special ex-
emption for religious organizations not required by the first amend-
ment in the context of fund raising regulation, it may indeed be
prohibited.
The real issue here is not whether a city may charge for the
dissemination of ideas but whether the states have power to
require those who need additional facilities to help bear the
cost of furnishing such facilities. . . . To say that the Consti-
tution forbids the states to obtain the necessary revenue from
the whole of a class that enjoys these benefits and facilities,
• . . is to say that the Constitution requires, not that the dis-
semination of ideas in the interest of religion shall be free, but
that it shall be subsidized by the state. Such a claim offends
the most important of all aspects of religious freedom in this
country, namely, that of the separation of church and state.'2 0
The criticisms and warnings of the Murdock dissent may have
been premature. Murdock certainly did not hold that only the solicita-
tion activities of religious groups would warrant extended first amend-
ment protection; the question of whether a "special exemption" was
118. Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 179 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring & dissent-
ing). Justice Jackson's concurring and dissenting opinion was appended to the decision in
Douglas and was written in response to the Murdock decision and Martin v. Struthers, 319
U.S. 141 (1943).
119. Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. at 179.
120. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 139-40 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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being carved out for only religious groups was left unanswered. The
Court did not reach the question of the protection to be afforded non-
commercial and nonreligious solicitation; it only distinguished between
religious and commercial solicitations. Thus, the concerns of the Mur-
dock dissent were the concerns facing the Court in Schaumburg, that
is, to what extent was the Murdock opinion tied to the religious factors
involved in that case.
Analysis of Murdock's underlying theory leads to the conclusion
that the decision was not necessarily tied to religious factors, although
this "theory" was not cogently or explicitly articulated by the Court.
The Murdock Court, like the later Schaumburg Court, noted that cer-
tain speech "elements" did exist in solicitation activity. For example, it
noted that solicitation includes the communication of information (via
the spreading of religious literature),12 1 the propagation of views,
122
and the advocacy of a cause (conversion effort). 123 Moreover, solicita-
tion is necessary to the organization because it provides the financial
means for the organization to continue its evangelistic efforts.
24
Fundamentally, however, the theoretical basis for Murdock is not
provided by mere reference to the speech elements of solicitation, but is
provided in that Court's emphasis of the specific quality of the solicita-
tion which emanates its first amendment character. This specific quali-
ty in solicitation is the nexus that exists between an appeal for funds
and the informational and advocacy effort created by the religious mis-
sionary in the conversion effort. The persuasive, informational, and
financial aspects inherent in the evangelistic effort to win converts are
so inextricably bound, that the entire contact between the missionary
and the public assumes a first amendment (speech) character. Thus,
the appeal for funds is no more than an "incidental" and "collateral"
portion of the solicitation encounter.
125
What was left unresolved in Murdock was whether this special
quality that existed in the "nexus" of religious solicitation was peculiar
to religious evangelism or whether the same first amendment quality
could be found in other nonreligious solicitations as well. During the
1940's, the only litigative context in which nonreligious solicitation was
presented to the Court was in the guise of commercial enterprises in
121. Id at 108-09.
122. Id
123. Id at 109.
124. Id at 109 n.7.
125. Id at 111-12 (quoting State v. Mead, 230 Iowa 1217, 1219, 300 N.W. 523, 524
(1941)). See also 319 U.S. at 109, 115 & 117.
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Valentine and Breard2 6 and, thus, for the moment the first amendment
quality present in the practices of the Witnesses could not be found in a
nonreligious setting. This was to change, however, with the canvassing
and fund raising tactics of the public interest advocacy groups working
some three decades later.
The "nexus" approach to solicitation received its best articulation
in Schaumburg, and appeared to be the basis for the Court's concluding
that although the Village ordinance might be constitutionally applied
to the more traditional forms of charity, it could not constitutionally be
applied to public interest groups. The Court noted that public interest
groups "necessarily combine"' 7 the financial aspect of the solicitation
with the public interest advocacy. As in religious solicitation, this "nec-
essary combination" is not merely an appeal for money; it is an exhor-
tation to the person solicited to show his support. The receipt of
monies effects the culmination of the advocacy. The solicitation does
more than provide financial support; it implies that the soliciting organ-
ization has won a commitment from the solicited person. The grant or
denial of a contribution is itself an expression of advocacy.'
28
Under this analysis, religious solicitation is deemed to be a pro-
tected activity because of its "speech" character. The fact that the solic-
itors may or may not be engaging in a religious rite is irrelevant. Thus,
even if Murdock had not explicitly relied on speech grounds, the foun-
dations for such reliance were implicit in that opinion. Thus, Schaum-
burg simply expanded Murdock and, accordingly, is not properly
susceptible to the charge leveled earlier that it had engaged in a doctri-
nal leap.'29 The problem of exonerating the Schaumburg Court is ob-
vious, however. In Schaumburg, the Court did not analyze Murdock to
determine the latter's theoretical bases. Thus, the Schaumburg Court
gave the appearance of having taken a doctrinal leap even if it actually
did not. But whether it is termed a doctrinal leap or an expansion,
Schaumburg has at least provided a reference through which the differ-
ing first amendment strains left dangling in Murdock can be forged
into a coherent understanding.
126. See notes 45-48 supra and accompanying text.
127. 444 U.S. at 635 (quoting Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 590 F.2d
220, 225 (7th Cir. 1978)).
128. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
129. The Supreme Court opinion in Schaumburg may have undertaken a doctrinal leap
in holding that all charitable solicitations are to be protected. The holding of the Seventh
Circuit limiting protection to public interest groups is on firmer footing.
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IV. RELIGIOUS SOLICITATION AFTER SCHAUMB~uRG: AN EXTRA
LAYER OF PROTECTION?
Although the Court in Murdock may have relied on speech
grounds in reaching its conclusions, that fact does not preclude the pos-
sibility that the Court also may have relied on religious grounds, either
in the alternative or in addition to the speech grounds. For the mo-
ment, however, the cumulative impact of Murdock and Schaumburg is
established. The solicitations of charitable and religious organizations
constitute noncommercial speech under the first amendment.
There remains the question of how Schaumburg will affect future
cases dealing with religious solicitation. Does Schaumburg equalize
the protection afforded secular and religious solicitation or is there a
constitutional requirement that solicitation by religious organizations
be afforded a higher degree of protection?
The question is by no means irrelevant. The Schaumburg Court,
for example, suggested that disclosure laws would be a permissive
means to regulate fund raising. Yet religious organizations are already
testing the applicability of such laws to religious organizations on the
grounds that the laws infringe on their speech and religious guaran-
tees.130 Principally, religious groups have claimed that this type of law
unconstitutionally infringes upon the right of free speech, right of free
exercise, and right to establish a religion.
The first of these arguments, that such a law infringes upon the
religious organization's right of free speech, will be the most difficult to
maintain after Schaumburg, because that case held that solicitations of
secular organizations are protected noncommercial speech. Therefore,
in order for the Court to hold that religious solicitation is entitled to
additional protection under the specch clause, it would have to hold
that it is permissible to constitutionally distinguish between classes of
protected speech. Then the Court would have to hold that religious
speech is somehow more deserving of protection than other classes of
protected speech. The Court, however, has frequently and vehemently
indicated that such a distinction cuts at the central and fundamental
purpose of the first amendment. As the Court noted in Police Depart-
ment of Chicago v. Mosley:1
3 1
But, above all else, the First Amendment means that govern-
130. See Fernandes v. Limmer, 465 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Tex. 1979). See also ISKCON v.
Griffin, 437 F. Supp. 666 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
131. 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (citations omitted). In Mosley, the Court struck down a Chicago
ordinance that prohibited all picketing within 150 feet of a school except for peaceful picket-
ing of any school involved in a labor dispute.
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ment has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its' subject matter, or its content. . .. To
permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and
to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are
guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from govern-
ment censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is
content control. . . . There is an 'equality of status in the
field of ideas,' and government must afford all points of view
an equal opportunity to be heard.'32
Thus, although there may be nonspeech reasons to constitutionally
require the exemption of religious solicitation from regulations that
may control nonreligious solicitations, there is no authority after
Schaumburg that justifies this exemption on speech grounds. The
Schaumburg Court, by holding that secular charitable regulations are
protected activities, effectively equalized the speech value in secular
and religious solicitation. Any subsequent differentiation between reli-
gious and nonreligious solicitation on speech grounds would be tanta-
mount to content discrimination, and therefore, is antithetical to the
principles inherent in the speech clause of the first amendment.1
33
The argument that additional protection must be accorded reli-
gious solicitation on free exercise grounds over and above that pro-
vided under .free speech grounds is potentially more credible.
Governmental regulations of religious fund raising have been struck
down under the free exercise clause prior to Schaumburg,134 but again,
the influence of Schaumburg is likely to be profound. In order to suc-
ceed in a free exercise challenge after Schaumburg, the issue must be
phrased in terms of whether the free exercise clause mandates a greater
degree of constitutional protection than does the free speech clause.
There is surprisingly little authority on this subject. However, the
available law indicates that the answer to this inquiry will be negative.
The first case that sheds light on this issue is Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,135 where the defendant, a Jehovah's Witness, was con-
victed of violating a statute that made it a crime to use offensive lan-
132. Id at 95-96 (citations omitted).
133. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); New York Times Co. v. Sull-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
134. See, e.g., Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413
(1943); ISKCON v. State Fair, 461 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Tex. 1978); ISKCON v. Conlisk, 374
F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. IL 1973); ISKCON v. City of New Orleans, 347 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. La.
1972).
135. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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guage against another person in a public place. The Court upheld the
conviction against both speech and religious challenges.136 The speech
challenge was dismissed under the "fighting words" doctrine, i e. use of
insulting or fighting words is not within the ambit of protected speech.
The Court easily dismissed the religious challenge and noted that
"even if the activities of the appellant. . . could be viewed as religious
in character. . . they would not cloak him with immunity from the
legal consequences for concomitant acts committed in violation of a
valid criminal statute."' 137 Arguably, Chaplinsky suggests that if a free
speech challenge is not sustainable on a certain set of facts then a free
exercise challenge on these same facts will not be successful either.
The equal treatment accorded free exercise and free speech chal-
lenges, evidenced in Chaplinsky, is also substantiated by reference to
the constitutional tests that the Court has devised in dealing with
speech and religion challenges. In fact, the tests are identical. The free
exercise test, as announced in Sherbert v. Verner, 138 requires the gov-
ernmental interest that infringes upon religious activity to be "compel-
ling" in order to justify the infringement.' 39 The free exercise test in
Sherbert was adopted virtually verbatim from the free speech test ar-
ticulated in NAACP v. Button, 4 ' as the Sherbert Court noted.'' Thus,
the use of identical tests appears to preclude the possibility that differ-
ent results could be achieved.'42 If a state interest is deemed "compel-
ling" with respect to a speech challenge, it must similarly be
"compelling" with respect to a free exercise challenge.
The only possible exception to the above analysis may exist in situ-
ations where the Court finds that the particular religious activity in-
fringed is of central and critical importance to the religion involved. 1
43
In such limited situations, the Court has added additional weight to the
religious practitioner's side of the Sherbert balancing equation. In Wis-
consin v. Yoder,'" the Amish were exempted from compulsory educa-
136. Id at 571.
137. Id
138. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
139. Id at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
140. 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
141. 374 U.S. at 403.
142. The same considerations would be present in a challenge of a solicitation statute
because after Schaumburg both free exercise and free speech interests are recognized as
being present in religious solicitation activity.
143. The centrality principle is discussed in Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,
and Doctrinal Development-Part Z The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARv. L. REV.
1381, 1394-96, 1417-21 (1967).
144. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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tion laws and in People v. Woody, 45 the Native Americans were
exempted from statutes prohibiting the use of peyote. No court has
held, however, that this "centrality" principle could be used to exempt
a religion from a valid general regulation as applied to core speech
activity. It is difficult to imagine how this centrality argument could be
presented in the solicitation context. The underlying argument of the
religious group would have to be that solicitation was a central part of
their religion and its disturbance critically handicapped their religious
practice. Judge Young, in a thoughtful opinion in Edwards v. Mary-
land, 146 held that although the practice of begging and alms giving has
religious significance in the Hari Krishna religion, it was not so central
as to exempt that group from a general regulation.147
Even if an organization were able to satisfy the centrality test, it is
unlikely that it would be able to succeed in a free exercise challenge
upon a solicitation regulation where a free speech challenge had failed.
Inherent in a positive result to such a challenge would be the conclu-
sion that the exercise of religion is entitled to a higher deference than
the exercise of the right of expression. The Court in its first amend-
ment litany has suggested that precisely the opposite is true; that if any
freedom is considered preferred, it is the freedom of speech.1 48  A
favorable holding by the Court on the free exercise claim would require
the Court to disavow these earlier cases. 149 Moreover, as has been
pointed out by Professor Kurland, although the establishment clause
provides a restraint upon the free exercise principle in the first amend-
145. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
146. 476 F. Supp. 153 (D. Md. 1979).
147. Id at 165.
148. See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Political
speech, in particular, has been advanced as being of prime first amendment concern because
it is through the political system that our societal decisions are affected, including those that
may affect our religious practices. Thus, the Court in Buckley . Valeo, in dealing with a
campaign practices case, described the governmental regulations involved in that case as
operating "in an area of the mostfundamental First Amendment activities." 424 U.S. 1, 14
(1976) (emphasis added).
149. One Justice, Justice Murphy, believed that the freedom of religion was the preferred
freedom. Concurring in Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), he-stated, "I believe noth-
ing enjoys a higher estate in our society than the right [to] ... freely... practice and
proclaim one's religious convictions." Id at 149 (Murphy, J., concurring). Previously in
Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942) (the opinion later overruled by Murdock), he had
stated that "[i]mportant as free speech and a free press are to a free government and a free
citizenry, there is a right even more dear to many individuals-the right to worship their
Maker." Id at 621 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Justice Murphy was joined in his Martin opin-
ion by Justices Rutledge and Douglas and was joined in his Opelika decision by Justices
Black, Douglas, and Stone.
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ment, there is no such restraint upon the speech clause.150 Thus, the
wording of the first amendment itself leads to the conclusion that it is
the speech clause, and not the free exercise clause, that is potentially
entitled to greater deference. 5'
The final inquiry is whether a religious organization will be able to
maintain a successful establishment clause attack against a statute that
is constitutionally able to withstand a free speech challenge after
Schaumburg. Again this question has remained unanswered in the
courts, although one decision"' after Schaumburg did hold on estab-
lishment clause grounds that a charitable solicitation scheme was un-
constitutional as applied to religious organizations. The court did not
interpret the validity of the law with respect to other forms of protected
solicitations.
The tests for determining the validity of a law under the establish-
ment clause were initially set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman "3 and have
150. Kurland, supra note 100, at 52. The Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976),
has affirmed Professor Kurland's theory. In Buckley it was argued that public subsidy of
elections was prohibited as being an establishment clause type of violation. As the state
cannot subsidize religion, so, it was argued, can the state not subsidize partisan politics. The
court, however, dismissed the argument in a footnote. Id at 93 n.126. Analysis of this issue
is found in Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 SuP. CT.
REv. 1, 31-34.
151. An inference that the speech clause is entitled to more constitutional deference than
is the free exercise clause is found in the flag salute cases. In 1940, the Court in Minersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), reversed a Third Circuit ruling which held that
compulsory participation in flag salute ceremonies was unconstitutional with respect to those
persons who claimed that the salute exercises conflicted with their religious beliefs. The
Supreme Court, per Justice Frankfurter, rejected the Court of Appeals' conclusion: "The
mere possession of religious convictions Which contradict the relevant concerns of a political
society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities." Id at
594-95. Compulsory flag salute ceremonies were then constitutionally permissible.
Three year later in West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the
Court overruled Gobitis and held the flag salute statutes to be unconstitutional. Id at 642.
Barnette, however, turned on speech and not religious grounds, although the latter ground
was argued in that case as well. The Court held that it need not reach the religion issue. Id
Its failure to do so left the Gobitis holding, that the statute did not violate free exercise,
unanswered. Thus, the possibility remains that a free speech challenge may be sustained
while a free exercise claim is denied where both liberties are equally at issue.
152. Heritage Village Church v. North Carolina, 299 N.C. 399, 263 S.E.2d 726 (1980).
There were two parts to the finding. The first, of no concern here, was that the North Caro-
lina statute was unconstitutional in that it impermissibly exempted some churches from its
requirements while requiring compliance from those religious organizations whose financial
support is derived from contributions solicited from persons other than its own members.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-75.7(a)(1). The second finding of the court was that the statute's
disclosure and percentage limitations worked as an unconstitutional entanglement between
church and state under the establishment clause. Id at 17-20.
153. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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recently been reiterated in Committeefor Public Education & Religious
Liberty v. Regan."' The tests are: the statute must have a secular pur-
pose, its principal or primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit
religion, and it must not foster an excessive governmental entangle-
ment with religion.1
55
The relationship of the establishment tests to statutory provisions
that regulate certain activities is not immediately apparent. As has
been stated by the Court, "establishment" in its original understanding
"connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of
the sovereign in religious activity." 5 6 Therefore, previously the estab-
lishment clause inquiry by the Supreme Court was aimed exclusively at
statutory provisions which conferred a benefit upon religious institu-
tions, such as aid to parochial education, 57 tax exemptions, 58 or stat-
utes which are based on the tenets of certain religious beliefs.'
5 9
Recently, however, the lower courts, focusing on the entanglement
prong of the establishment test, have inquired as to general regulatory
measures which in no way confer a benefit upon a religious institu-
tion. '6 The Supreme Court itself has performed statutory cartwheels
in order to construe a general regulatory measure as exempting reli-
gious institutions, thereby avoiding the constitutional entanglement
question. 16  Thus, although the question is open, it is likely that the
Court will hold that an entanglement analysis may be appropriate in
dealing with the effects of regulatory laws upon religious organiza-
tions.16
2
Entanglement brings into play a different set of considerations
than are present in either the free exercise or free speech issues. The
154. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
155. Id at 623 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
156. Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
157. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646
(1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
158. Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
159. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
160. Surinach v. Pesquera De Busquets, 604 F.2d 73 (Ist Cir. 1979); Fernandes v. Lim-
mer, 465 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Heritage Village Church v. North Carolina, 299
N.C. 399, 263 S.E.2d 726 (1980).
161. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
162. One author has already suggested that the entanglement test be confined to analysis
of statutory provisions which do provide benefits to religious institutions. Gianella, Lemon
and Tilton: The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglement, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 147,
172. See also Heritage Village Church v. North Carolina, 299 N.C. 399, 263 S.E.2d 726
(1980) (Huskins, J., dissenting). Judge Huskins argued that the application of the entangle-
ment analysis to a regulatory provision is no more than a restatement of the free exercise
issue. Id at 414, 263 S.E.2d at 741.
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concern in entanglement is not the relative strength or preferred nature
of a particular freedom guarantee; rather the concern is the overall re-
sulting relationship between church and state that is affected by the
challenged statute. Thus, the entanglement inquiry does not apply to
such matters as whether a religious solicitor will be allowed special ac-
cess to a forum that has been denied to nonreligious fund raisers.
1 63
Entanglement inquiry is pertinent solely to those statutory provisions
which result in a regulatory relationship between the state and the ac-
tivity of the organization. Examples of such provisions include disclo-
sure laws of the type receiving judicial approbation in Schaumburg,
164
and percentage limitations both of the type struck down in Schaumburg
and of the type upheld in National Foundation v. Fort Worth .165
Regardless of which type of statutory provision is involved, the
statute should stand against an entanglement attack if it has already
been held constitutional with respect to nonreligious protected activity.
Again the key is that if the statute has survived the free speech chal-
lenge it has been found to be supported by "compelling" state inter-
ests. 166 It would appear, therefore, to be anomalous for a "compelling"
state statute to be construed as fostering excessive entanglement as is
required by the establishment test. A finding of "compelling" would
seem to preclude that the same provision be construed as "excessive."
To the extent that the nonexcessive language in the entanglement test
requires that the statutory provision in question be narrowly drawn,
that factor too is covered in the speech inquiry. 167 If a statute is nar-
rowly drawn so as to avoid unnecessary intrusions into protected activ-
ity, it would seem that it similarly would not be excessive in its
application to that activity.
The problem with the entanglement issue is that, superficially, pro-
visions such as disclosure laws appear to create an involvement of state
with religion. Indeed, they do. However, the Court has acknowledged
that in state/church relations "some involvement and entanglement are
inevitable."'168 Thus, it has been held that the SEC may require a rell-
163. See, e.g., Edwards v. Maryland State Fair, 476 F. Supp. 153 (D. Md. 1979); ISK-
CON v. City of New Orleans, 347 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. La. 1972).
164. See Fernandes v. Limmer, 465 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Heritage Village
Church v. North Carolina, 299 N.C. 399, 263 S.E.2d 726 (1980).
165. 415 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970). The difference be-
tween the Schaumburg and Fort Worth regulations is that the Fort Worth ordinance allowed
the percentage limitation to be waived if it could be shown that the organization's adminis-
trative costs were not "unreasonable." See id at 46.
166. See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. at 626.
168. Lemmon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
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gious organization to submit to the provisions of the Securities and Ex-
change Act' 6 9 and that a state may require a religious organization to
provide its records for state review pursuant to a criminal subpoena.
70
If the state's interest is strong enough to outweigh free exercise (or free
speech) concerns, it will necessarily survive the entanglement inquiry.
Indeed, the leading case, Surninach v. Pesquera De Busquets,17' which
expanded the entanglement inquiry to regulatory measures, stated as
much. Religious solicitation and secular solicitation appear to be on an
equal plane after Schaumburg.
CONCLUSION
A situation need not be of establishment clause proportions before
the problem inherent in granting special exemption and privileges to
religious institutions becomes apparent. Since Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire172 and Cantwell v. Connecticut,173 it has been held that an
organization or person should not be able to proceed unregulated
under the pretext of religious conviction into areas where, because of
important governmental interests, those not religiously motivated may
not go.
The problem of preferential religious treatment is perhaps most
acute in areas relating to fund raising. The critical concern is that there
are generally no distinctions between the external manifestations of re-
ligious fund raising and secular fund raising other than the inherent
nature of the person's beliefs. In addition, as we broaden our defini-
tions of religion and religious activity, 174 expand the financial and reg-
ulatory benefits already available to those claiming religious status, 17
and become increasingly reluctant to inquire into the legitimacy of a
person's religious beliefs, 176 the problem is expanding to almost limit-
169. SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976).
170. In re Rabbinical Seminary, 450 F: Supp. 1078 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
171. 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979).
172. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
173. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
174. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965), held that a religious purpose is one
that occupies the same place in the belief of the holder as an orthodox belief in God. In
Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977), af'd, 592 F.2d 197 (3rd Cir. 1979), the
court held it was a violation of the establishment clause to teach transcendental meditation
in the public schools on the ground that it was the teaching of religious doctrine.
175. See Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973) (tax exemptions). See also Universal Life Church, Inc. v.
United States, 372 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Cal. 1974). But see United States v. Kuch, 288 F.
Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968), where the court did not allow a group claiming to be a religious
organization an exemption from federal drug regulations regarding LSD.
176. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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-less proportions. One does not normally associate, for example, the
sale of frozen fish'77 or the issuance of financial securities 178 with reli-
gious activity, but in two recent cases the courts were faced with such
claims. Even more disturbing, is a statement by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in a footnote in International Societyfor Krishna Conscious-
ness v. Eaves.' 79 The court noted that the Murdock case leads to the
arguable conclusion that a religious organization may constitutionally
claim exemption from a regulatory provision solely because it needs the
funds to prosper and survive.180
Perhaps the most articulate argument against special exemption
for religious fund raising activity was voiced by Justice Jackson, con-
curring in Prince v. Massachusetts:II'
I think the limits [on religious freedom] begin to operate
whenever activities begin to affect or collide with liberties of
others or of the public. Religious activities which concern
only members of the faith are and ought to be free-as nearly
absolutely free as anything can be. But beyond these, many
religious denominations or sects engage in collateral and sec-
ular activities intended to obtain means from unbelievers to
sustain the worshippers and their leaders. They raise money,
not merely by passing the plate to those who voluntarily at-
tend services or by contributions by their own people, but by
solicitations and drives addressed to the public by holding
public dinners and entertainments, by various kinds of sales
and Bingo games and lotteries. All such money-raising activi-
ties on a public scale are, I think, Caesar's affairs and may be
regulated by the state so long as it does not discriminate
against one because he is doing them for a religious pur-
pose.18
2
In his following paragraph, Justice Jackson again criticized Mur-
dock for rejecting this principle of separating immune religious activi-
ties from secular type activities.18 3 But in this criticism Justice Jackson
also went too far. Unlike the "ordinary commercial methods of sales of
177. Muhammad Temple of Islam v. Shreveport, 387 F. Supp. 1129 (W.D. La. 1974),
at'd, 517 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1975).
178. SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976).
179. 601 F.2d 809, 826-27 n.15 (5th Cir. 1979).
180. Id
181. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
182. Id at 177-78.
183. Id at 178.
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articles to raise propaganda funds," '18 4 the activities of the Jehovah's
Witnesses in Murdock were a matter of first amendment concern.
The entire evangelistic encounter is pervaded with the type of
communications and advocacy that is at the heart of the first amend-
ment. The question in Murdock was not whether that case was rightly
decided; it was. The question was whether it would be wrongly inter-
preted so as to require special exemptions for religious activity in fund
raising endeavors that did not share the first amendment character of
the Witnesses' evangelism in Murdocc. This question has apparently
been answered through the back door in Schaumburg. By elevating the
first amendment status of nonreligious solicitation to that accorded reli-
gious solicitation, the Court has eliminated the "special exemption"
and assuaged the concerns, however belatedly, of Justice Jackson and
the other Murdock dissenters. At the same time, the Court, by recog-
nizing the first amendment character inherent in certain solicitations
(specifically the "secular evangelism" of the public interest groups), has
accepted the important, albeit unarticulated, foundation of Murdock,
and in so doing has added to our first amendment understanding. The
problem with Schaumburg is that it accomplished these results without
the reasoning or discussion that would have made the opinion itself an
invaluable first amendment teaching.
184. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. at 110.
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